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a b s t r a c t 
By developing a two-stage model the paper examines the cost inefficiency levels of Turkish banks during 
the period from 2007 to 2016. Using the notion of Koopmans input efficiency we deconstruct the esti- 
mated Nerlovian cost inefficiency to the sum of slack-based allocative and technical inefficiency levels. 
Alongside the traditional inputs, intermediates and outputs used to model banks’ performance measure 
we additionally use their labor education quality factor as a non-discretionary input. This allows us to 
model how human capital factors affect a bank’s revenue generation stage. Our findings suggest that cost 
inefficiency levels are driven mainly by a bank’s ability to control its allocative inefficiency levels. The 
empirical evidence also shows that foreign banks perform better, suggesting that bank ownership struc- 
tures matter when measuring cost performance. Finally, it is evident that the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
had a negative effect on banks’ ability to minimize their cost inefficiency levels. However, the post-crisis 
findings demonstrate that Turkish banks have started to recover from its negative effects, mainly by im- 
proving their allocative performance. 










































Conventional Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models
12,13] treat the Decision Making Unit (DMU) as a ‘black box’ 
hat consumes inputs to produce outputs while making no as-
umption about the internal structure of the DMU [18] . Network
EA models take into account the internal structure of the DMU,
hich consists of two or more stages linked with intermediate
ariables [46,47] . Network DEA models are based on the seminal
ork of Färe and Grosskopf [26] , who were the first to study the
black box’. Two-stage network DEA models are a special case of
etwork models first introduced by Wang et al. [91] and they can
e divided into four categories depending on their assumptions:
ndependent, connected, relational and game theoretic [52] . In-
ependent network models apply conventional single-stage DEA
odels separately to each stage, without considering the interac-
ion between the two stages [85,91] . Connected models consider
he interactions between the stages [26] . Relational models which
ssume an additive or multiplicative relationship between the∗ Corresponding author. 
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banks’ production process: Evidence from the Turkish banking system,verall and the stage efficiencies [14,51] . The last category is about
odels based on game theoretic approaches [59,60] . 
There is extensive research on the efficiency assessment of
anking institutions that deploys network based DEA models. In
act, the banking industry is the second most widely used field
or the applications of DEA in the literature [24] . The recent ad-
ances on two-stage network DEA models provide the practition-
rs with several measurement advantages in order to tackle tra-
itional modeling challenges when estimating bank’s production
rocess. Specifically, one of the main modelling challenges is how
ank deposits should be treated. Deposits can be treated in the
odel either as inputs or as outputs in the system (the so-called
deposit dilemma”). Burger and Humphrey (1992) investigated the
deposit dilemma” and identified three distinct approaches: (1) the
ntermediation approach, which treats deposits as inputs to pro-
uce loans, securities and other earning assets; (2) the produc-
ion approach, which considers deposits as outputs; and (3) the
ost approach, which is a case-sensitive approach relative to the
et contribution of deposits to bank revenue. According to Berger
nd Humphrey [9] , deposits possess both input and output fea-
ures. The bank production process can also be formulated as a
wo-stage network system where in the first stage traditional in-
uts, such as employees and fixed assets, can be deployed to at-
ract deposits that are then used in the second stage to generate
oans and other securities [36,42,49] . This alternative formulation, A Nerlovian cost inefficiency two-stage DEA model for modeling 
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u 1 2 H  
1 The standard DEA method is developed by Farrell [29] and Charnes et al. [12] , provides a plausible solution to the “deposits dilemma” and keeps
the dual role of deposits intact. 
In addition, the majority of the previous literature is focused
on technical and allocative efficiency and only a few of the stud-
ies investigate profit/revenue efficiency [31] . This is mainly caused
because of the lack of good quality data to obtain output prices
and the difficulties arising from breaking down profit efficiency
into technical and allocative efficiency [32] . Fukuyama and Ma-
tousek [37] overcame the aforementioned problems and they es-
timated the price for NPLs as well as the Nerlovian revenue maxi-
mization model [76] whose overall efficiency can be broken down
into technical and allocative components. However, Fukuyama and
Matousek [37] applied a weakly efficient output frontier which
overestimates the true technical efficiency and overlooks possible
slacks. In order to surpass this drawback, Fukuyama and Matousek
[38] applied a strongly efficient output frontier by modifying the
model of Färe et al. [27,28] into an additive alternative that fits
into the Nerlovian revenue function and the directional distance
function model. 
By building upon the latest advances as has been introduced
by Fukuyama and Matousek [38–40] , this paper contributes to the
related literature in several ways. Firstly, based on the directional
distance function (DDF) framework it measures banks’ technical
efficiency in relation to less efficient inputs proposing a network
cost decomposition slack-based model. That means the proposed
model contributes to the established toolkit for analyzing cost-
efficient production [17] . We also avoid the overestimation on in-
put technical efficiency measure by applying Koopmans input effi-
cient (strong input efficiency) frontier. Secondly, for the first time
in the related literature we account in banks’ cost efficiency mea-
surement the effect of employees’ educational level (human cap-
ital). The contemporary research asserts that human capital has
been widely recognized as the driving force behind intellectual
capital, suggesting that educated employees have the ability to
solve problems, provide innovative solutions and be able to cre-
ate tangible and intangible assets [10,71,78] . Fogel et al. [33] sug-
gest that managers with high skills are linked with companies’
higher human capital levels, whereas King et al. [54] provide evi-
dence that managers’ skills increase bank performance. In addition
Miller et al. [72] provide evidence that managers’ academic qual-
ifications are interrelated with their firm’s performance, whereas,
Onkelinx et al. [77] suggests that investments in employee human
capital are important for labor productivity. Maglen [68] showed
that educated labor can adapt efficiently to different or ganizational
changes since the skills adopted by education can increase labor’s
capacity to learn and handle better new information. Education is
also regarded as a vital input of firms’ production function since
it provides the framework for new technology adaptation [8] . This
in turn can lead to positive externalities within the banks struc-
ture from sharing knowledge among skilled and unskilled work-
ers. Acemoglu [1,2] asserts that education within firm results on
the increase of firms’ technical change. Similarly, Moretti [73] and
Fleisher et al. [34] assert that there is a direct link between labor
education and firms’ productivity. 
It is rather surprising, giving the importance of human capi-
tal that there are no studies in the banking efficiency literature
that would include the human capital factor as an input in the
bank production process. Our study is the first to model the hu-
man capital factor as an input in the bank production function in
a two-stage network DEA framework. Finally, the paper contributes
to rather extensive empirical research on the Turkish banking in-
dustry by evaluating the performance of 25 savings banks over the
period from 2007 to 2016. 
The structure of our paper is as follows: Section 2 evalu-
ates the relative literature, whereas Section 3 presents the model. a
Please cite this article as: H. Fukuyama, R. Matousek and N.G. Tzeremes
banks’ production process: Evidence from the Turkish banking system,ection 4 describes our data and the findings of the empirical ap-
lication. Finally, the last Section concludes the paper. 
. Selective literature review of DEA methods dealing with 
ank efficiency 
Starting with Wang et al. [91] and Seiford and Zhu [85] , net-
ork DEA models are becoming increasingly popular in modeling
anking efficiency. Mukherjee et al. [74] used a connected ap-
roach to examine the quality and the profitability efficiency of 27
ndian public sector banks. Fukuyama and Weber [41] introduced
 directional SBI (slacks-based inefficiency) measure and evaluated
 sample of Japanese Shinkin cooperative banks over the period
rom 2002 to 2005. They have proved that in the absence of slacks
he SBI measure collapses to the directional technology distance
unction. Yang and Liu [99] used a network model to measure
anagerial efficiency in Taiwanese banks. Akther et al. [3] investi-
ated 19 private commercial banks and two government-owned in
angladesh. Their model examined the value added activity in the
rst stage and the profit generation in the second stage. Lin and
hiu [62] applied a slacks-based network model to evaluate the
fficiency of the multi-dimension structure of Taiwanese banks.
anke and Barros [94] adapted a centralized game approach to
nvestigate the cost efficiency and the productive efficiency in
ajor Brazilian banks. Wang et al. (2014) combined a relational
odel with a fuzzy multi-objective approach to study US bank
olding companies. Wu et al. [98] examined the managerial and
rofitability efficiency of Southeast Asian banks using a dynamic
etwork model. 
Despite the large number of network DEA papers on banking
iterature, see Table 1 , only a handful of them tackle the issue
f non-performing loans (NPLs). Based on the previous work on
odeling NPLs in DEA models ( [39,40,79] ), Fukuyama and Weber
42] were the first to use NPLs in a network DEA model. They used
 directional slacks-based network DEA model that assumed weak
isposability of undesirable outputs. Akther et al. [3] employed
 similar model to evaluate the efficiency of Bangladeshi banks.
ukuyama and Weber [43] developed a dynamic network model
o investigate the efficiency of Japanese cooperative Shinkin banks
sing deposits as the single intermediate variable, while Fukuyama
nd Weber [44] extended this approach to embrace more in-
ermediate variables. Fujii et al. [35] constructed a weighted-
ussell directional distance model equivalent to slacks-based in-
fficiency (SBI) and investigated the efficiency and productivity
hange of Indian banks using a Luenberger productivity index.
ozano [65,66] extended the approach of Fukuyama and Weber
42] into a general network process and adopted the weak dis-
osability of Kuosmanen [55] . Fukuyama and Matousek [37] intro-
uced a two-stage bank revenue function including NPLs to study
apanese banks. Fukuyama and Matousek [38] deviated from the
revious papers which use a weakly efficient output frontier and
omputed a strongly efficient one. 
. Two-stage network DEA methodology in a bank context: 
otation and background 
In this study we consider a two-stage network DEA 1 framework
or Turkish banking efficiency assessment. Stage 1 represents a
roduction process, in which variable inputs x = ( x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N ) T ∈
 
N + produce intermediate products z = ( z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z Q ) T ∈  Q + . Stage
 represents a production process, in which the intermediate prod-
cts and quality profile variables f = ( f , f , . . . , f ) T ∈  H + are usednd Banker et al. [7] . 
, A Nerlovian cost inefficiency two-stage DEA model for modeling 
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Table 1 
A review of the relative literature. 
Authors Application scheme Use of NPLs 
Akther et al. 19 Bangladesh private commercial banks and 2 government owned YES 
[3] 27 banks No 
Chen et al. ]7 banks No 
[15,16] 27 banks No 
Du et al. 30 Top U.S. commercial banks No 
[22] 25 Turkish commercial banks YES 
Fukuyama and Matousek Japanese banks YES 
[37] Japanese banks YES 
Fukuyama and Weber Japanese banks NO 
[41] Japanese banks YES 
Fukuyama and Weber Japanese banks YES 
[43] Japanese banks YES 
Fujii et al. Indian banks YES 
[35] 41 Taiwanese commercial banks No 
Holod and Lewis Bank holding companies YES 
[49] 27 banks No 
Kwon and Lee U.S. banks No 
[57] a. 27 banks No 
Liang et al. [59] b. 30 Top U.S. commercial banks 
Liu and Lu [63] 27 banks No 
Liu et al. [64] Chinese commercial banks No 
Lozano 15 Chinese banks YES 
[65] 245 large banks No 
Meepadung et al. 6 segments of a major Thai bank No 
[70] 27 Indian public sector banks No 
Naini et al. 35 Iranian bank branches No 
[75] 27 banks No 
Seiford and Zhu 55 U.S. Commercial banks No 
[85] a. Banking industry No 
Toloo et al. [87] b. University operations 
Wang et al. 22 banks No 
[91,92] 16 Chinese commercial banks No 
Wang et al. U.S. banking holding companies No 
[93] Brazilian banks No 
Yang et al. 17 bank branches of China Construction Bank No 
[100] 30 top U.S. commercial banks No 
Zha et al. 25 Chinese banks No 













































v  s input factors to produce NPLs-generated intended good out-
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, . . . , b 
L 
) T ∈  L + . Here, the NPLs-
enerated intended output means that ˙ y
˙ m 
is directly linked to
 
l 
, i.e., the bad output must be increased proportionately in or-
er to increase the linked good output (joint weak disposabil-
ty). Fig. 1 shows our proposed two-stage production framework.
ote that, while the term ‘non-NPLs-generated’ means that ÿ 
m̈ 
s not proportionally linked to b 
l 
, they are not completely inde-
endent in the production process. Note that the bad outputs in
ur study are nonperforming loans. We formally discuss the joint
eak disposability property after defining the production technol-
gy. Fig. 1 also visualizes a two-stage network bank production
rocess, where the first and second stages correspond to the fund-
aising and the revenue-generating activity, respectively. This pro-
uction process differs from those used in Fukuyama and Weber
42,44,45] and Fukuyama and Matousek [37,38] since it models dif-
erently banks’ production process using the quality of labor (hu-
an capital factor) that is involved in banks’ revenue generation
rocess. As a result the quality profile variables (labor’s educa-
ional quality in our bank production framework) go into Stage 2
s non-discretionary inputs because the quality of labor cannot be
hanged within a year. 
Stage 1 technology representing fund-raising is denoted by [1]
 
[ 1 ] = { (x , z ) | z is producible from x } (1) 
Please cite this article as: H. Fukuyama, R. Matousek and N.G. Tzeremes
banks’ production process: Evidence from the Turkish banking system,nd the Stage 2 technology representing revenue-generation is de-
oted by 
 
[ 2 ] = 
{(
z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b 
)| (z , f ) is used to produce ( ̇ y , ÿ , b ) }. (2) 
The production possibility set (or the whole system technology)
omprised of stage technologies, T [1] and T [2] , is represented as 
 = 
{(
x , z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b 
)∣∣ (x , z ) ∈ T [ 1 ] and (f , z , ˙ y , ÿ , b ) ∈ T [ 2 ] }
(3) 
hich is the convex disposal hull of T [1] and T [2] . We distinguish
etween the two kinds of intended good outputs. Whereas ÿ does
ot generate bad outputs, ˙ y is a bad-output-causing intended out-
ut. To implement this relationship, we assume that ˙ y and b satisfy
he joint weak disposability (JWD) which states (
x , z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b 
)
∈ T and 1 ≥ ϑ ≥ 0 , j = 1 , ..., J 
⇒ 
(
x , z , f , ϑ ̇ y , ÿ , ϑb 
)
∈ T (4) 
Eq. (4) states that the proportional reduction in the bad outputs
n Stage 2 brings about the proportional reduction in the linked
ood outputs in Stage 2. In contrast, the good output ÿ does not
ave a JWD relationship such as (4). The black-box version of JWD
iven in Eq. (4) was proposed by Shephard [86] . 
Relative to Eq. (3) , the bank cost function is denoted by 
 
(
w , p , r ; f , ˙ y , ̈y 
)
= min 
x , b , z 
{
wx + pz + rb 
∣∣ (x , z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b ) ∈ T }
(5) 
here w ∈  N ++ , p ∈  Q ++ and r ∈  L ++ are positive row price-
ectors of x, z and b , respectively, and hence wx, pz and rb are the, A Nerlovian cost inefficiency two-stage DEA model for modeling 
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Fig. 1. Two-stage network bank production process. 
Note:x n refers to the discretionary inputs (total fixed assets and number of employees), z q refers to deposits, f h refers to the human capital factor, ˙ y ˙ m refers to various loans, 
ÿ m̈ refers to securities investments, and b l refers to various types of nonperforming loans (NPLs). Note also that ̇ y ˙ m are good outputs caused by the bad outputs, whereas, ÿ m̈ 









































C  inner products. This paper assumes that the cost associated with
intermediate products plays a significant part for a bank. Relative










∣∣ (x − βg x , z − βg z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b − βg b ) ∈ T }, (6)
where g = ( g x , g z , g b ) is a triple of directional vectors for the in-
puts in Stage 1, the intermediate inputs in Stage 2 and the bad
outputs in Stage 2, and the network slack-based input inefficiency
measure [42] is denoted as: 
SBI 
(
x , z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b ; g 
)
= max 









s x n 





s z q 











x − s x , z −
s x





x , z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b ; g 
)
≤ ( 
wx + pz + rb ) − C 
(
w , p , r ; f , ˙ y , ̈y 
)
wg x + pg z + rg b (8)
where w g x + p g z + r g b > 0 is a normalization factor being able to
establish a duality relationship between the input directional dis-
tance function and the cost function under the presence of bad
outputs. 2 For a black-box production process without bad outputs,




x , z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b ; g 
)
= inf 
w , p , r 
{ 
( wx + pz + rb ) − C 
(
w , p , r ; f , ̇ y , ̈y 
)
wg x + pg z + rg b 
} 
. (9)
We denote input-oriented directional technical inefficiency as
DT I =  D ( x , z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b ; g ) . Let Nerlovian cost inefficiency be de-
noted by 
NC I = 
wx + pz + rb − C 
(
w , p , r ; f , ˙ y , ̈y 
)
wg x + pg z + rg b . (10)
Define the residual between NCI and DTI as directional alloca-
tive inefficiency: 
DAI = NCI − DT I (11)2 If one formulates the bank cost function (4) with respect to the Lagrangian, 
then the Lagrange multiplier is equal to wg x + pg z + rg b . 
 
Please cite this article as: H. Fukuyama, R. Matousek and N.G. Tzeremes
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)
∈ T , 




From Mahler’s directional inequality (8) , it is clear that
CI ≥ DTI as long as the production vector belongs to the produc-
ion possibility set (3) . As a consequence, we obtain the following
erlovian cost inefficiency decomposition: 
CI = DAI + DT I. (12)
The DAI measure of Eq. (11) may include input surpluses, be-
ause DTI is the translated origin-based radial measure with re-
pect to the weakly efficient frontier. The efficiency measurement
y means of DTI may lead to overestimation of technical effi-
iency and underestimation of allocative efficiency. In order to
vercome this problem, we turn to the concept of strong input ef-
ciency (Koopmans input efficiency). Let us first define a subset of
 as τ (f ) = { ( x , z , ˙ y , ÿ , b ) | ( x , z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b ) ∈ T } . The Koopmans in-




x , z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b 
)
= 0 if and only if 
(
x , z , ˙ y , ÿ , b 
)
∈ K ( τ (f ) ) 
(13)
here K ( τ ( f )) is the Koopmans input efficient frontier of τ ( f ). 
Now let the star ∗ indicate optimality in (5) . If
( x − s x ∗, z − s z∗, ̇  y , ÿ , b − s b∗) ∈ τ (f ) , then we have 
 
(
w , p , r ; f , ˙ y , ̈y 
)
≤ w ( x − s x ∗) + p ( z − s z∗) + r 
(
b − s b∗
)
. (14)
If ( x , z , ˙ y , ÿ , b ) / ∈ K( τ ( f ) ) , then the following holds. 
wx + pz + rb − C 
(
w , p , r ; f , ˙ y , ̈y 
)
≥ ws x ∗ + ps z∗ + rs b∗
= SBI 
(












s x ∗n 

















⎠ . (15), A Nerlovian cost inefficiency two-stage DEA model for modeling 
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wg x + pg z + rg b , for al l n = 1 , . . . , N;
αz q = 
p q 





wg x + pg z + rg b , for al l l = 1 , . . . , L (16) 
Regarding the size of technical inefficiency, SBI( f , x , ˙ y , ÿ , b ; g )
as value interpretation if it is adjusted by the last term of Eq. (14) .
herefore, in order to make a comparison between cost inefficiency
nd technical inefficiency, we define the slack-based technical in-
fficiency (SBTI) measure as 
BT I = SBI 
(












s x ∗n 


















Taking the difference between (10) and (7) , we denote the
lack-based allocative inefficiency, SBAI, as follows: 
BAI = NCI − SBT I (18)
t follows from Eq. (18) that Nerlovian cost inefficiency is the sum
f SBAI and SBTI: 
CI = SBT I + SBAI (19)
hich is an adaptation of Färe et al. [28] and Fukuyama and Ma-
ousek [38] . When the input prices as well as bad output prices
re available, all the components in Eq. (19) are value-based (e.g.,
ollars or Turkish Lirasi). 
Petersen [81] examines optimal endogenous directions in a DDF
ramework evaluating revenue and cost efficiency models. In the























3 N w 1 
, . . . , 
1 








3 Q p 1 
, . . . , 
1 








3 L r 1 
, . . . , 
1 
3 L r L 
)T 
. (20) 
If Eq. (20) is presumed, then the normalization factor wg x +
g z + rg b equals one and the slack-based technical inefficiency isPlease cite this article as: H. Fukuyama, R. Matousek and N.G. Tzeremes
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SBI 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎝ x , z , f , ˙ y , ÿ , b ;








3 L r 














r l s 
b∗
l (21) 
Since SBI( f , x , ˙ y , ÿ , b ; g ) equals the total value of input wastes
nd over-production of bad outputs under the presumption of (20) ,
CI becomes simply a difference between the observed cost and
he minimal cost and hence NCI and its technical and allocative
omponents have a monetary interpretation. It must be noted that
he equality presented in (20) holds only under the assumption of
19) since normally SBI is not equal to SBTI due to the adjustment
actor [38] . However, if we apply the directional vector presented
n Eq. (19) then the SBI equals the SBTI. 
For an empirical implementation, suppose there are J ob-
ervations related to each bank, say bank j = 1 , . . . , J. Then
he production vectors for bank j = 1 , . . . , J are represented
s follows: x 
j 




, . . . , x 
N j 
) T , z 
j 




, . . . , z 
Q j 







, . . . , f 
H j 
) T , ˙ y 
j 




, . . . , ˙ y
˙ M j 
) T , ÿ 
j 













, . . . , b 
L j 
) T . Let λ[1] = ( λ[1] 
1 
, . . . , λ[1] 
J 
) and λ[2] =
( λ[2] 
1 
, . . . , λ[2] 
J 
) be vectors of intensity variables of stages 1 and 2
nd 0 is an appropriate dimensional vector of zeros. The produc-
ion possibility set that is denoted as follows: 
 = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
(






























λ[ 2 ] 
j 





























λ[ 1 ] 
j 
= 1 ;
λ[ 1 ] ≥ 0 , ∀ j; J ∑ 
j=1 
λ[ 2 ] 
j 
= 1 ;
λ[ 2 ] 
j 
≥ 0 , ∀ j; 1 ≥ ϑ 
j 
≥ 0 , ∀ j 
⎫ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭ 
(22) 











= 1 impose variable returns to scale for both stage
echnologies. 
The literature suggests using either constant or non-constant
batement factor across firms. Whereas Färe and Grosskopf [30], A Nerlovian cost inefficiency two-stage DEA model for modeling 
 Omega, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2020.102198 
6 H. Fukuyama, R. Matousek and N.G. Tzeremes / Omega xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
























































































3 The price used on deposits captures the interest rate paid to depositors which 
is associated with the cost of deposits [82–84,101,102] . However, According to [4] it 
is neither usual nor desirable for banks to minimize the volume of their deposits in 
order to minimize their associated costs since they are essential to generate loans. 
As a result in many cases they are treated as non-discretionary inputs [48] . 
4 There is also one bank (Birle ̧s ik Fon Bankası A. ̧S .) which is under the savings 
deposit insurance fund. used the constant scaling factor across firms (i.e., ϑ = ϑ 
j 
, (∀ j) ,
Kuosmanen [55] suggested using the non-unique abatement factor
across firms. See also Kuosmanen and Podinovski [56] for the non-
unique abatement factor. Epure and Lafuente [25] used the non-
unique abatement factor in a bank context. In a two-stage network
DEA setting, Fukuyama and Weber [45] , and Fukuyama and Ma-
tousek [38] for example used the non-constant scaling factor. Us-
ing the Kuosmanen procedure, we linearize Eq. (22) as follows: 
T = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
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λ[ 1 ] 
j 
= 1 ; λ[ 1 ] ≥ 0 , ∀ j;
μ
j 
≥ 0 , ∀ j; δ
j 
≥ 0 , ∀ j 
Using Eq. (23) as production technology, we obtain bank cost
function (5) and SBI (7) . To estimate the (input-oriented) direc-
tional distance function (6) , we implement our specification of in-
put saving orientation as follows: 
β∗o = max 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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λ[ 1 ] 
j 
= 1 ; λ[ 1 ] ≥ 0 , ∀ j; ∑
j
j 
≥ 0 , ∀ j; δ
j 
≥ 0 , ∀ j; s −z ≥ 0 , ∀ j; β : unrestri
where β∗o represents the technical inefficiency of Bank ‘o’. In
Eq. (24) , the constraints related to stage 1, 
∑ J 
j=1 z j λ
[1] 
j 
≥ z − βg b −
s z , are intermediate outputs, but the constraints related to stage 2,∑ J 
j=1 z j ( μ j + δ j ) = z − βg b − s z , are intermediate inputs. Take this
into account, reductions of the intermediate product with inequal-
ity and equality symbols are incorporated as shown in (24) . 
A nonparametric cost function is obtained as 
 
(
w , p , r ; f o , ˙ y o , ̈y o 
)
= min 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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≥ 0 , ∀ j; δ
j 
≥ 0 , ∀ j; x ≥ 0 ; z ≥ 0 ; ˙ y ≥ 0 ;
In cost minimization (25) , the constraints on in-
termediate products have the following relationship:
[ 
∑ J 
j=1 z j λ
[1] 
j 
≥ z , and ∑ J 
j=1 z j ( μ j + δ j ) ≤ z ] ⇔ 
∑ J 




z ≥∑ J 
j=1 z j ( μ j + δ j ) . 
4. Data description and empirical findings 
In our analysis we use as discretionary inputs total fixed assets
and number of employees. The price of labor is calculated as per-
sonnel expenses /total number of employees and the price of to-
tal fixed assets as the ratio of other operating expenses/total fixed
assets. As intermediate inputs we use total deposits and the la-
bor quality profile (human capital). The price of total deposits isPlease cite this article as: H. Fukuyama, R. Matousek and N.G. Tzeremes
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0 ; β : unrestricted . 
⎫ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭ 
(25)
alculated as the ratio of interest rate expenses on deposits/total
eposits. 3 Ozkan et al. [78] analyzed the structure of the Turk-
sh banking system. The Turkish banking system consists of: sav-
ngs banks, development and investment and participation banks.
ur paper investigates the performance of savings banks, which
re further categorized by the state-owned banks, the privately
wned banks, and the foreign owned banks. 4 Moreover, based on
ee and Lee [58] we construct a per employee education quality
human capital) index, which is equal to the sum of the shares of
orkers, weighted by educational levels, across all education cat-
gories. In our case we have four educational categories within
he bank labor force. We have employees with primary school,
ith high school, with undergraduate and postgraduate educa-
ion levels. On average 1.5% of bank employees have a primary
chool education, 18.6% high school education, 72% undergradu-
te and 7.9% postgraduate education. The constructed index en-
ures that the higher the index, the higher banks’ employee ed-
cational levels. Fig. 2 presents diachronically the constructed ed-
cational index based on banks’ ownership structure. Our findings
ndicate that Foreign owned banks diachronically, have employed
ore educated personnel compared to private and state owned
anks. Moreover, it is observed that state owned banks diachron-
cally, have increased their human capital index (in terms of em-
loyed personnel with higher educational levels). This is clearly
vident over the period 2012–2016. Privately owned banks also ap-
ear to employ staff with higher education levels, however, during, A Nerlovian cost inefficiency two-stage DEA model for modeling 
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p  he period 2011–2016 the are left behind in contrast to the foreign
nd state owned banks. 
Finally, we use three outputs. The first output is trading secu-
ities (good output), whereas the price of trading securities is cal-
ulated as: profit/losses on trading account securities/trading se-
urities. The second output (bad output) is non-performing loans
NPLs), whereas the price of NPLs is calculated as: provision for
oan losses/NPLs. 5 The third output is net loans (good output),
hereas the price of net loans is calculated as: interest income on
oans/total loans. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all5 The price metric used for NPLs is essential since it captures the interest lost 
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banks’ production process: Evidence from the Turkish banking system,he variables used in our model. When we analyze the trends of
he variables over the years we observe a number of fluctuations
hich will reflect upon the estimated efficiency levels. Especially
ver the entire period we can observe an increase in banks’ NPLs
evels. Partovi and Matousek [80] reported that Turkish banks’ bal-
nce sheets have been fluctuated over the period 2006–2016, char-
cterized not only by an increase of banks’ assets, but also by an
ncrease in banks’ ratio of NPLs after provision to total loans. Our
ata sample covers the deposit banks operating in Turkey over the
eriod from 2007 to 2016. The sample was collected by the Banks’
ssociation of Turkey (BAT). Our sample includes 25 commercial
anks and the values of the individual variables that include NPLs,
rading securities and net loans are reported in Turkish Lira. , A Nerlovian cost inefficiency two-stage DEA model for modeling 
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Trading securities Price of trading securities NPLs Price of NPLs Net Loans Price of Net Loans 
2007 Mean 347.2606 0.3188 322.4908 0.5087 8701.1627 0.1353 
Std 824.9941 0.7317 445.7671 0.3481 10571.6343 0.0674 
2008 Mean 148.0661 0.5332 328.9650 0.6884 8675.9328 0.1397 
Std 165.5121 1.2385 413.6046 0.5138 10753.1616 0.0886 
2009 Mean 209.4845 1.0631 527.0039 0.5213 9546.6803 0.1475 
Std 306.3944 1.9489 612.3593 0.2234 12034.1398 0.0656 
2010 Mean 227.6008 1.6676 468.2297 0.5441 11485.1661 0.0912 
Std 262.5259 4.8635 532.4531 0.6683 14223.2274 0.0734 
2011 Mean 237.7440 1.1777 365.0094 0.4314 13012.4679 0.1014 
Std 287.9746 4.8801 402.9932 0.2966 16098.1583 0.0406 
2012 Mean 210.7264 1.3359 481.2209 0.5063 15838.6185 0.1490 
Std 240.7154 3.3742 545.5716 0.2554 19467.7575 0.1618 
2013 Mean 306.8458 1.3044 501.9024 0.4823 17177.7990 0.0821 
Std 355.7839 5.5698 571.0970 0.2782 21249.7964 0.0374 
2014 Mean 200.2995 0.0879 553.8939 0.4312 18566.3418 0.1214 
Std 246.1861 0.7737 626.0798 0.2482 23133.8316 0.1103 
2015 Mean 234.0675 0.0351 574.8677 0.3984 17664.4666 0.2108 
Std 286.2219 0.1664 654.0601 0.1981 22146.4316 0.3763 
2016 Mean 328.8571 0.0459 605.9887 0.4780 16965.3267 0.1887 
Std 497.0990 0.2272 715.7401 0.3748 21877.8300 0.4408 
Discretionary Inputs 
Total fixed assets Price of total fixed assets Number of Employees Price of Labor 
2007 Mean 342.7311 2.4180 5902.2000 0.0455 
Std 520.3263 1.5419 6448.8579 0.0131 
2008 Mean 284.3037 3.9959 6388.9600 0.0407 
Std 408.8608 6.7541 6904.0085 0.0145 
2009 Mean 302.0931 2.8984 6431.2400 0.0456 
Std 424.9029 2.2788 7156.0330 0.0214 
2010 Mean 295.8130 4.8639 6686.0800 0.0482 
Std 415.9877 7.2968 7469.0331 0.0297 
2011 Mean 260.7748 3.9014 6997.6400 0.0421 
Std 338.9886 4.0618 7777.5122 0.0198 
2012 Mean 286.2244 4.2472 7159.2000 0.0516 
Std 363.3013 4.8086 7815.1836 0.0350 
2013 Mean 239.7354 5.0689 7549.2000 0.0459 
Std 309.5688 5.1906 8236.1015 0.0255 
2014 Mean 313.5600 4.4271 7651.5600 0.0504 
Std 480.3154 5.0532 8360.9386 0.0285 
2015 Mean 335.4585 5.5155 7666.4400 0.0442 
Std 520.4358 7.2456 8622.8380 0.0270 
2016 Mean 298.1739 5.6778 7680.2800 0.0405 
Std 455.3225 8.4990 8446.6802 0.0300 
Intermediate Products 
Total Deposits Price of total Deposits Quality profile (human capital index) 
2007 Mean 12111.2747 1.3538 0.2282 
Std 16522.9036 6.1548 0.0398 
2008 Mean 12048.2134 0.1178 0.2285 
Std 16590.3350 0.0425 0.0335 
2009 Mean 14012.7454 0.0770 0.2321 
Std 20674.8802 0.0206 0.0334 
2010 Mean 15075.0080 0.0579 0.2379 
Std 20510.1130 0.0311 0.0321 
2011 Mean 14665.5107 0.0680 0.2414 
Std 18935.2729 0.0517 0.0317 
2012 Mean 17122.4904 0.0785 0.2434 
Std 21763.7406 0.0394 0.0308 
2013 Mean 17317.9756 0.0470 0.2472 
Std 21876.1906 0.0186 0.0321 
2014 Mean 17620.8228 0.1030 0.2523 
Std 22030.1226 0.1764 0.0255 
2015 Mean 16577.6966 0.0646 0.2493 
Std 20985.8781 0.0270 0.0300 
2016 Mean 16043.1598 0.0781 0.2571 
Std 20525.0727 0.0948 0.0281 
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Table 3 
Diachronic representation of banks’ inefficiency measures based on ownership structure. 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Row Mean 
Foreign Banks NCI Mean 391.8659 409.0712 469.8682 377.9899 363.2449 383.6759 457.9755 374.7439 334.7155 279.0173 384.2168 
Std 384.7951 456.5684 487.8452 424.7010 322.9818 461.5785 572.6782 474.2457 426.0198 355.5794 436.6993 
DAI Mean 375.6511 336.8442 40 0.60 02 358.3679 317.5903 345.6206 415.8276 354.2575 272.0895 273.3788 345.0228 
Std 388.7334 351.4981 448.5371 411.3716 263.3075 387.0187 507.2828 432.0332 314.9294 358.6119 386.3324 
DTI Mean 16.2147 72.2270 69.2680 19.6220 45.6546 38.0553 42.1479 20.4864 62.6260 5.6385 39.1940 
Std 38.9152 169.5370 154.9685 61.1178 110.8973 134.4983 87.1485 71.7785 205.6225 17.9348 105.2418 
SBAI Mean 12.2400 12.2727 0.0028 0.5858 55.5179 1.8478 5.6485 2.7948 5.8029 30.1166 12.6830 
Std 44.1321 39.7417 0.0099 1.4555 188.1541 5.5315 19.6350 7.1100 15.0471 73.9423 39.4759 
SBTI Mean 379.6258 396.7985 469.8655 377.4041 307.7270 381.8280 452.3270 371.9491 328.9126 248.9007 371.5338 
Std 382.4783 457.4950 487.8481 425.1871 324.9640 462.4122 577.1549 475.3256 429.6437 305.4293 432.7938 
Privately-owned Banks NCI Mean 826.3787 920.4086 808.6632 644.9115 563.8248 613.9925 824.7083 721.0045 609.0577 577.7723 711.0722 
Std 1022.0899 904.7226 773.6050 604.7686 447.1160 601.0219 743.9922 789.4200 674.2074 603.0164 716.3960 
DAI Mean 695.9648 825.4583 751.7861 634.2378 533.1328 570.5164 801.2581 678.2771 598.7320 557.1889 664.6552 
Std 828.1848 845.5511 745.1094 612.7918 450.7950 621.9222 761.7442 737.9735 682.3637 609.6584 689.6094 
DTI Mean 130.4139 94.9503 56.8771 10.6737 30.6920 43.4761 23.4502 42.7275 10.3258 20.5833 46.4170 
Std 258.4884 161.1354 94.7889 15.3239 66.8535 87.1191 38.4692 98.4909 17.6452 29.6193 86.7934 
SBAI Mean 2.8112 47.2562 17.2302 79.7077 26.6831 66.4837 166.1634 111.2943 33.8671 32.3487 58.3846 
Std 7.9514 121.3979 24.2717 184.6433 65.1661 114.9393 467.1539 282.5230 59.4722 86.3465 141.3865 
SBTI Mean 823.5674 873.1524 791.4330 565.2038 537.1417 547.5088 658.5449 609.7102 575.1906 545.4235 652.6876 
Std 1023.4296 926.1438 763.8274 567.7454 451.6427 605.6856 763.1229 826.3742 688.5694 629.4575 724.5998 
State-owned Banks NCI Mean 2693.0381 669.9201 379.7135 1468.6996 2657.9349 1934.9019 1563.9648 1657.6437 545.6717 447.0979 1401.8586 
Std 2942.3679 1098.9120 594.8779 1511.6722 3874.1779 2031.4594 1450.7170 1393.2642 844.1649 698.2329 1643.9846 
DAI Mean 2566.9469 515.9873 295.2232 1356.9455 2562.7173 1144.8530 1119.6172 1237.9904 352.0048 241.9232 1139.4209 
Std 2983.8908 836.9953 468.6084 1562.1407 3946.6472 1178.8828 1062.6681 1190.9498 541.3840 373.7460 1414.5913 
DTI Mean 126.0911 153.9328 84.4903 111.7541 95.2176 790.0489 4 4 4.3476 419.6533 193.6669 205.1747 262.4377 
Std 213.7886 262.0029 126.3512 165.6630 158.7170 854.4485 393.8974 424.3925 302.7928 324.5082 322.6562 
SBAI Mean 1951.0221 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 1032.8461 2372.5595 0.2187 0.0 0 0 0 0.2366 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 535.6883 
Std 3379.2693 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 1788.9419 4105.5374 0.3788 0.0 0 0 0 0.4098 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 927.4537 
SBTI Mean 742.0160 669.9201 379.7135 435.8535 285.3754 1934.6832 1563.9648 1657.4071 545.6717 447.0979 866.1703 
Std 1257.4324 1098.9120 594.8779 659.8094 429.7524 2031.7639 1450.7170 1393.6577 844.1649 698.2329 1045.9320 










































































l  Based on our models presented previously, Table 3 presents di-
chronically banks’ inefficiency measures based on their owner-
hip structure. The Turkish banks have been grouped into three
ategories: foreign-owned; private-owned; and state-owned. When
valuating banks’ estimated Nerlovian cost inefficiency (NCI) levels,
e observe that the highest performance (lower inefficiency levels)
s obtained by foreign-owned banks, followed by private-owned
anks. The state-owned banks appear to have the worst perfor-
ance (higher inefficiency levels) throughout the entire evaluated
eriod. It must mentioned that for 5 years (20 08, 20 09, 2013, 2015
nd 2016) state owned banks’ SBAI levels are reported to be 0
i.e., fully allocative efficient). This phenomenon implies that dur-
ng those years state-owned banks’ NCI levels were mainly driven
y their technical inefficiency (i.e., SBTI = NCI). From the other hand
conomic theory suggests that when a bank is allocative efficient,
t is implied that the management of the bank tries to produce
nancial services and financial products based on consumers’ pref-
rences. In other words, the price that bank consumers are will-
ng to pay for state-owned banks’ services equalizes with their
arginal utility. This, in turn, is equivalent to banks’ marginal cost
f production (i.e., banks’ marginal cost is equal to consumers’
arginal utility). This finding supports the study by Partovi and
atousek [80] who suggested that the state owned banks have
een through major restructuring and stability programs. As a re-
ult, the restructuring program (over the period 20 0 0–20 05) im-
osed on the Turkish banking system enhanced the demand for
ervices and the banking trust of Turkish consumers for the state-
wned banks’ services [5] . In addition, over the last two years (i.e.,
015 and 2016) we observe a significant drop of their inefficiency
evels. This phenomenon maybe attributed to better NPLs manage-
ent over the last two years of our analysis with the employ-
ent of educated personnel (see Fig. 2 ). The restructuring period
esulted in major changes for the state-owned banks. contribute
o Educated employees are less resistance to several changes im-
osed from the restructuring programs. The employment of ed-
cated personnel enhances also the adoption of new innovative
anagerial processes and other technological changes [1,2] whichPlease cite this article as: H. Fukuyama, R. Matousek and N.G. Tzeremes
banks’ production process: Evidence from the Turkish banking system,esulted on the reduction of state owned banks’ inefficiency
evels. 
Regardless those developments, we find that over the examined
eriod state owned banks are the lowest performers among the
ther two types. This is mainly due to the fluctuations of their
alance sheets and from the increased level of NPLs. Our find-
ng aligns with the views expressed by Delis [21] , who showed
hat state ownership in the bank system causes a negative ef-
ect on banks’ generated revenues compared to the positive effect
hat is created by the foreign ownership. Similar findings regard-
ng the lower performance of state-owned banks have also been
eported by Tzeremes [90] and by Juo et al. [50] for the Indian and
he Taiwanese banking systems, respectively. The estimated NCI, as
as been previously explained, is the sum of the input-oriented
irectional technical inefficiency (DTI) and input-oriented direc-
ional allocative inefficiency (DAI) levels. Our findings reported in
able 3 suggest that in all the cases the NCI is caused mainly by
igher levels of DAI. However, the estimated DTI leads to overesti-
ation of the technical efficiency level, therefore our findings are
ndicating that banks’ NCI levels are caused mainly due to DAI. In
rder to overcome this bias, in our estimation we use the notion
f Koopmans input efficiency and we calculate banks’ slack-based
echnical inefficiency (SBTI) levels. In this case, our findings sug-
est that the control of banks’ NCI levels are mainly attributed to
he ability to control mainly for their technical (SBTI) rather than
heir allocative (SBAI) inefficiency levels. 
Table 4 presents diachronically the evaluated banks’ NCI lev-
ls ranked by their estimated performance. The top ten best per-
ormerming banks are reported to be: Habib Bank Limited, Bank
ellat, Société Générale (SA), Arap Türk Bankası A. ̧S ., Birle ̧s ik Fon
ankası A. ̧S ., Turkish Bank A. ̧S , The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc,
urkland Bank A. ̧S , Tekstil Bankası A. ̧S . and Alternatifbank A. ̧S . As is
llustrated in Table 4 . The majority of the banks are foreign owned
i.e., six out of ten), whereas only one state-owned bank (Turkland
ank A. ̧S ) is among the highest performers. Fig. 3 then presents the
ensity plots of the logarithmic form of the estimated inefficiency
evels for 2007, 2011 and 2016, both for the NCI levels and their, A Nerlovian cost inefficiency two-stage DEA model for modeling 
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Table 4 
Per year banks’ Nerlovian cost inefficiency levels. 
Bank Name Ownership 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Mean Std 
Habib Bank Limited Foreign-owned Banks 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0358 0.6412 0.1037 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0781 0.2006 
Bank Mellat Foreign-owned Banks 4.1174 3.0861 3.5383 0.4318 97.1717 16.6050 10.2943 4.3780 6.2950 7.9844 15.3902 29.0921 
Société Générale (SA) Foreign-owned Banks 21.5134 39.5852 35.3637 36.7937 33.5910 36.4668 9.3013 35.3070 30.6393 12.5222 29.1084 10.7913 
Arap Türk Bankası A. ̧S . Foreign-owned Banks 25.9118 23.3433 27.2816 35.1857 56.8336 22.8737 70.9581 23.5676 25.2826 11.7159 32.2954 17.9163 
Birle ̧s ik Fon Bankası
A. ̧S . 
Banks Under the 
Deposit Insurance 
Fund 
59.5400 41.4495 43.3281 83.5706 32.9900 27.2659 28.9651 23.0895 15.2382 17.0701 37.2507 21.0179 
Turkish Bank A. ̧S Privately-owned Banks 57.2235 34.3081 50.7352 84.8119 44.8230 36.6280 24.7040 18.1540 24.4033 24.8939 40.0685 20.1925 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc 
Foreign-owned Banks 126.3268 79.7093 102.1871 64.7709 62.6290 19.8541 27.1550 41.2609 29.8262 18.5768 57.2296 36.8003 
Turkland Bank A. ̧S State-owned Banks 32.1931 71.5993 73.8456 112.6035 80.9377 49.3008 97.4423 112.9354 119.0105 89.6075 83.9476 28.3775 
Tekstil Bankası A. ̧S . Privately-owned Banks 115.2449 143.4476 101.2217 130.2823 106.6418 118.5377 87.7899 99.1590 95.6145 221.3527 121.9292 38.7484 
Alternatifbank A. ̧S Foreign-owned Banks 89.5594 114.1271 102.3198 69.3594 142.1039 125.8628 166.5062 155.6463 171.7511 131.9872 126.9223 33.5614 
Anadolubank A. ̧S . Privately-owned Banks 153.4378 116.8372 90.8363 113.2015 111.6442 107.9793 186.8794 149.2020 173.8620 150.5288 135.4408 31.6468 
Citibank A. ̧S . Foreign-owned Banks 506.8153 266.2940 421.8717 0.0 0 0 0 369.5093 0.0 0 0 0 145.4460 167.7588 146.8332 113.3870 213.7915 172.8625 
ING Bank A. ̧S . Foreign-owned Banks 532.3359 480.2731 481.5306 498.4385 452.8012 486.5297 554.6915 583.6259 465.1733 403.4414 493.8841 51.9982 
Denizbank A. ̧S . Foreign-owned Banks 376.4546 398.7971 570.1126 538.4003 584.6702 571.0565 1151.5750 852.5918 667.8372 517.5584 622.9054 228.6203 
HSBC Bank A. ̧S . Foreign-owned Banks 639.2908 829.3737 1024.3847 831.8850 618.4734 485.3734 628.0135 522.9723 252.1631 507.1857 633.9115 217.6472 
Türkiye Garanti 
Bankası A. ̧S 
Foreign-owned Banks 1103.8300 997.8659 1301.3115 1013.0843 681.1762 777.5139 253.4135 0.0 0 0 0 212.2316 0.0 0 0 0 634.0427 482.0808 
Ş ekerbank T.A. ̧S . Privately-owned Banks 568.9175 561.0341 459.4574 333.6192 633.3550 552.1178 513.7994 1867.4800 454.0748 396.9365 634.0792 442.3990 
Türk Ekonomi Bankası
A. ̧S . 
Privately-owned Banks 409.7351 746.3720 632.5785 427.3238 695.2130 765.3327 847.8080 858.9024 723.0651 635.7364 674.2067 154.4522 
Finans Bank A. ̧S Foreign-owned Banks 679.8322 632.5148 747.1450 702.1193 609.0466 1051.8722 1148.8799 1098.9496 992.3007 951.9104 861.4571 207.6705 
Akbank T.A. ̧S Privately-owned Banks 646.0889 2469.6511 1690.0888 1204.3877 615.2113 324.9170 1330.2783 846.7939 161.6225 245.9243 953.4964 729.4870 
Türkiye Vakıflar 
Bankası T.A.O. 
Foreign-owned Banks 988.2687 1452.9560 1291.2049 1122.7581 1014.0738 1393.7786 1787.4476 1385.6127 1350.9681 950.9555 1273.8024 259.2968 
Türkiye ̇I ̧s Bankası A. ̧S Privately-owned Banks 1634.7669 1441.9853 1729.6582 1437.5020 1162.9460 1534.7605 1710.7806 45.7137 1389.4865 1173.6839 1326.1284 490.8892 
Türkiye Halk Bankası
A. ̧S . 
State-owned Banks 2193.8549 1938.1609 1065.2949 1194.9569 779.6421 1669.3116 1596.1101 2040.6493 1518.0047 1251.6863 1524.7672 454.6561 
Yapı ve Kredi Bankası
A. ̧S . 
Privately-owned Banks 3025.6147 1849.6332 1714.7294 1428.1640 1140.7639 1471.6674 1895.6268 1882.6312 1850.3331 1773.1217 1803.2285 495.7202 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Ziraat Bankası A. ̧S . 
State-owned Banks 5853.0662 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 3098.5383 7113.2250 4086.0934 2998.3420 2819.3464 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 2596.8611 2596.0514 
Notes: Tick marks on the x-axis are sampled data points. In all cases the results indicate that the ‘HC’ variable is statistically significant at least at the 5% level. The 
approximate 95% confidence intervals are indicated by the dashed lines. 
Fig. 4. The effect of employees’ quality profile (human capital index) on banks’ inefficiency measures. 
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Table 5 
Regression results. 
HC HC 2 HC 3 R − squared
Model 1 DAI 0.959438 ∗∗∗ 0.381857 
[12.4] 
Model 2 DAI 3.20563 ∗∗∗ −2.16177 ∗∗∗ 0.430529 
[6.495] [ −4.604] 
Model 3 DAI 1.22895 0.498552 −0.653173 0.433302 
[0.6592] [0.2023] [ −1.100] 
Model 4 DTI 0.984841 ∗∗∗ 0.246765 
[9.032] 
Model 5 DTI 2.33142 ∗∗∗ −1.29597 ∗ 0.257493 
[3.240] [ −1.893] 
Model 6 DTI −5.82429 ∗∗ 9.68042 ∗∗∗ −2.69496 ∗∗∗ 0.286453 
[ −2.180] [2.741] [ −3.166] 
Model 7 NCI 0.966330 ∗∗∗ 0.406096 
[13.05] 
Model 8 NCI 2.96845 ∗∗∗ −1.92688 ∗∗∗ 0.446636 
[6.248] [ −4.262] 
Model 9 NCI −0.684616 2.98962 −1.20712 ∗∗ 0.456567 
[ −0.3840] [1.268] [ −2.125] 
Model 10 SBAI 1.03137 ∗∗ 0.20255 
[2.269] 
Model 11 SBAI 0.431635 0.577199 0.020414 
[0.1429] [0.2008] 
Model 12 SBAI −16.0529 22.763 −5.44713 0.029269 
[ −1.410] [1.512] [ −1.501] 
Model 13 SBTI 0.964956 ∗∗∗ 0.394331 
[12.73] 
Model 14 SBTI 3.02203 ∗∗∗ −1.97976 ∗∗∗ 0.436005 
[6.217] [ −4.281] 
Model 15 SBTI −0.360054 2.57203 −1.11757 ∗ 0.444295 
[ −0.1971] [1.065] [1.920] 
Notes : The asterisks, ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , indicate that the coefficients are significant at the 
































































H  omponents. It is evident that at the outset of thethe Global Finan-
ial Crisis (GFC) banks’ estimated NCI levels are not much higher
ompared to levels in 2011. But they are much higher compared to
evels in 2016 ( Fig. 3 a). Our findings reveal an overall negative ef-
ect from GFC. The negative effect of GFC on bank efficiency level
as been also found support from the relative literature [19,67] .
owever, their findings regarding the recovery adjustment period
re different, suggesting the influence of the different financial in-
titutional and bank market characteristics [20] . In fact Partovi and
atousek [80] reported that the Turkish banking system wasn’t ex-
osed so much to the GFC in comparison with the European bank-
ng system. As has been reported previously DTI ( Fig. 3 c) over-
stimates banks technical efficiency levels and therefore the SBTI
 Fig. 3 d) findings must be adopted. As a result the estimated DTI
evels reveal that the majority of the banks have very low ineffi-
iency levels. Therefore, the cost inefficiency is then attributed on
anks’ DAI levels. Such an overestimation of banks’ technical inef-
ciency levels provide us with a biased picture of banks’ perfor-
ance levels. In contrast when we compare Fig. 3b with d we re-
lize that the improvement of banks’ performance during the eval-
ated periods was based on the reduction of banks’ technical inef-
ciency levels (SBTI). 6 
In a second stage of our analysis, Fig. 4 presents the effect of
mployees’ educational quality profile (human capital index-HC)
n the estimated inefficiency measures. Since we incorporate the
uman index variable as an input of banks’ production function,
e directly model its effect on the inefficiency estimation and
herefore a second stage regression type analysis can be meaning-
ul [6] . Fig. 4 presents our findings of a generalized additive model-
AM [95,96] . Given the fact that we have included the human in-
ex variable in our network inefficiency measures, we regress the
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banks’ production process: Evidence from the Turkish banking system,he human index variable directly. The smooth functions in our
AM model are a tensor product which has the ability to be in-
ariant to linear rescaling of covariates [97] . Moreover, in our sec-
nd stage non-parametric regression analysis we have used a log-
rithmic form of the various estimated network based inefficiency
stimates. In Fig. 4 the tick marks on the x-axis indicate the sam-
led data points. The 95% confidence intervals are indicated by the
ashed lines. Fig. 4a indicates the effect of HC on banks’ NCI lev-
ls, whereas, the rest of the subfigures present the effect on DTI
 Fig. 4b ), on DAI ( Fig. 4c ), on SBAI ( Fig. 4d ) and on SBTI ( Fig. 4e ).
he empirical evidence reveal a nonlinear effect of employees’ edu-
ational quality profile which in all the cases have been statistically
ignificant at least at the 5% level. Our findings further support the
iew that human capital variable is an important factor of banks’
roduction process [54,72,77] and must be included when measur-
ng banks’ production function. When we examine the effect on
CI the evidence suggest that for lower HC values the effect is
egative on banks’ inefficiency levels. Then we observe that it be-
omes positive (i.e., increasing banks’ inefficiency) and for higher
C values the effect becomes again negative (i.e., decreasing banks’
nefficiency). Our finding of nonlinear returns of human capital is
lso supported by the related literature [69,89] . According to Tsang
88] the negative effect of human capital on firms’ performance is 
ttributed to the underutilization of employees’ educational skills.
n fact, El-Gamal and Inanoglu [23] in the case of the Turkish bank-
ng system provided evidence of inefficient use of bank labor. In
rder to check the robustness of our findings we apply an ordi-
ary least squares (OLS) regression examine the effect of HC on
he different inefficiency measures. Table 5 presents our findings.
pecifically, in order to account for the nonlinear effects we regress
he inefficiency measures not only on HC but also on HC 2 and on
C 3 . Overall, the OLS estimates support our previous findings re-
orted earlier from the nonparametric regression. Especially, when
e look the effect of HC on NCI (Models 7–9) we retrieve a similar
icture as the one presented on Fig. 4a . , A Nerlovian cost inefficiency two-stage DEA model for modeling 
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5. Conclusions and managerial implications 
The related literature highlights the positive influence of edu-
cated labor on banks’ revenue process [33] . Educated labor adopts
more efficiently new technologies and different changes in orga-
nizational structures which in turn increases firms’ productivity
[34,73] . Moreover, educated labor can create positive externalities
with bank’s structure by sharing knowledge among skilled and un-
skilled workers [1,2,8] . Given the importance of human capital, the
studies estimating banks’ production process have ignored the ef-
fect of such factor(s) on banks’ efficiency measurement [53] . We
contribute to the bank efficiency literature by modeling the effect
of human capital on the estimation of banks’ production process in
a two-stage network DEA framework. By doing so, we apply pro-
posed modified two-stage Nerlovian cost inefficiency (NCI) model
to a sample of25 savings banks over the period from 2007 to 2016.
We provide a NCI measure that can be broken down into an addi-
tive measure either to the sum of directional allocative inefficiency
(DAI) and of directional technical inefficiency (DTI), or either to the
sum of slack-based allocative inefficiency (SBAI) and of slack-based
technical inefficiency (SBTI). From methodological point of view
we demonstrate that DTI overestimates banks’ performance lev-
els. In order to overcome the bias estimation we adopt the notion
of strong input efficiency (Koopmans input efficiency). Our empiri-
cal findings from the SBTI and SBAI measures indicate that banks’
increased NCI levels are attributed mainly from banks’ technical
inefficiency levels. As a result the reduction of banks’ cost ineffi-
ciency levels was based on the ability to increase their allocative
efficiency. From managerial point of view this finding highlights
the ability of the Turkish banking industry to provide financial ser-
vices and financial products which are aligned with the consumers’
preferences. 
Moreover, we provide empirical evidence that foreign banks
are better performers compared to the privately and state-owned
banks. However, during 2015 and 2016 the NCI levels of the state
owned banks have been decreased. This finding supports the study
by Partovi and Matousek [80] which highlights that the restructur-
ing program imposed to the Turkish banking industry had a posi-
tive effect on state owned banks’ performance levels. 
In a second stage analysis we examine the effect of banks’ la-
bor educational quality (human capital factor) on banks’ cost ef-
ficiency levels. Our empirical findings suggest that the estimated
effect on banks’ cost inefficiency measures can be non-linear, indi-
cating both positive and negative returns on banks’ cost efficiency
levels. In terms of the managerial implications, this finding im-
plies that overqualified personnel will not always reduce banks’
cost inefficiency levels. In fact, as Kauko [53] asserts, that the im-
pact of labor education on banks’ performance cannot be easily
understood, since there are interaction effects with banks’ charac-
teristics. In our case state owned banks have invested on educated
labor (especially over the period 2012–2016), however, their cost
inefficiency levels remained very high in comparison with the for-
eign and privately owned banks. The managerial implication be-
hind such finding indicates that underutilization of workers’ edu-
cational skills is another factor which can increase banks’ cost in-
efficiency levels. 
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